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The first objective in amending the Negotiable Instruments
Law should be to bring the statute into as nice adjustment with
present needs as possible. This consideration, it is believed,
overshadows all others. The act, viewed as a part of the con-
tract of the several parties to negotiable paper, should be written
to permit them to carry their transactions through efficiently and
in the manner contemplated. At the same time, the legislation
should not cloak unfair practices. It should be drafted to re-
quire only a minimum of recourse to the courts. Although these
ends seem obvious, there is by no means agreement as to how
the statute should be amended to attain them. What is a fair
ruile, what is an efficient or convenient one, or, in fact, what is
the understanding of the parties to commercial paper concerning
their agreement in any given case?
An endeavor is made in the following pages to produce some-
thing more substantial than mere conjecture on these points with
reference to certain of the more debatable of the changes which
may be made in the statute.1 In December a questionnaire was
sent out by the writer to some two hundred and fifty banks, trust
companies, bond and investment houses, one hundred and fifty
lawyers and to the teachers in Association schools giving the
negotiable instruments course-a: matter all told of about four
hundred questionnaires. Replies were received from all sections
of the country. Both the large city bank and the country bank
viewpoint is represented. So also, country and city attorneys
were interrogated, questionnaires being sent in each state to
those listed as handling a commercial practice. In a large per-
centage of cases, judged from the care with which replies were
amplified as well as from direct statements to that effect and the
time taken in giving a reply, it was evident that pains had been
taken to give a considered answer. Each questionnaire was
I A technical analysis of the proposed amendments was made in an earlier
article. The writer emphasized the importance of ascertaining the fact
basis for the proposed changes as being of probably greater importance to-
day than a careful adherence to common-law doctrine. See Turner, Rcrkion
of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 25.
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signed by the individual answering, or in the case of banks, by an
officer of the institution.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the replies received, how-
ever, recognition must be given to the position sometimes taken
that such findings have little, if any, place in a legal discussion.
Certainly courts, possibly in part for administrative reasons,
have been distinctly averse to giving any weight, at least in
their opinions, to such considerations. The majority of the
Supreme Court recently in a question peculiarly one of fact-
whether a state statute was within the "police power" or con-
stituted a taking of property "without due process of law"-
preferred rather to place their decision largely on supposed prin-
ciples derived from other cases involving other facts, than to
give weight to a comprehensive marshalling of facts concerning
the need for the particular statute.2
Granting that principles are extremely useful as generaliza-
tions from prior cases, should these be pursued to their logical
end in the interest of symmetry, leaving it to an already over-
burdened legislature to clear up the wreckage, or should the
courts modify their principles to fit the distinctly new cases as
they arise? The ideal of a fixed self-consistent body of principles
from which the rule for the new case can be deduced has been
slow to give ground. Yet it is clear that in every field the process
of putting new wine into old bottles, of modifying this principle
here and of refusing to apply that rule there, has been going
on continually. It should be equally clear that the grounds for
making these changes are often never stated. And while, no
doubt, they have usually been well based in fact, the emphasis
on the principle supposed to control the case, and on the prior
decisions supposed to stand for that principle, has obscured the
process by which it is determined that one result rather than
another should be reached.3 It may be largely because of this
that there has been developed no adequate method for con-
sciously evaluating data on a disputed point, the real process in-
volved in reaching a decision in close cases.4
2 Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928). The case
related to the validity of a New Jersey statute regulating employment
agencies. For an able discussion of the problem, see Comment (1928) 38
YAL L. J. 225. It has been this type of case more than any other in
which an effort has been made to support argument on prior cases and
legal principles with facts indicating the practical bearing of a decision
one way or the other, which after all should be, and possibly is, the chief
consideration of the court. The briefs by Brandeis and Frankfurter in the
labor cases have become classics.
3 The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Walter
Wheeler Cook for several of the ideas expressed in this paragraph.
4 A carefully worked out scheme for collecting data on bank payments,
weighting the various factors involved, appeared in this Journal recently.
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In fact, not only has no method been developed for analyzing
facts having to do with a problem, but much information which
it is believed would have been extremely valuable in many cases
has either been assumed by the court as fact without evidence,
or excluded altogether as irrelevant to the precise issue before
the court. For example, to use a clear case, Chief Justice
Gibson in McFaxland. v. Newman would undoubtedly have
refused any evidence that the movement to subject a seller to
warranties, instead of clogging commerce with law suits, was
actually producing fewer suits by removing the grounds for such
actions. The first fellow servant cases were decided on the
theory, at least in part, that a rule of non-responsibility on the
part of the master would be most likely to minimize the number
of personal injury cases.r Although this consideration had a
place, and it is believed no factor was entitled to greater weight,
there was almost no evidence taken on the point.
It must be conceded, however, that much of the reluctance on
the part of courts to place reliance on so-called facts is perhaps
natural enough. There are facts and facts. The expert witness
has had a malodorous record. So-called statistics may be made
to support either side of a case. And certainly court or legisla-
ture should not be asked to abandon its own intelligence to decide
with the majority adduced by a questionnaire. It is quite pos-
sible by careful phrasing of questions or inadequate presentation
of the implications of a question to evoke answers of no value
whatever. But the time-honored alternative of assuming fact3
without any evidence, and merely saying, often subconsciously,
"for commercial reasons," or of resorting to that overworked
dodge of deciding the new case "on principle" is altogether
indefensible. Some effort must be made to bridge this gap. The
findings on this questionnaire and the attempted evaluation of
answers are offered merely as further data, not in any sense
as final proof of the points made.
The proposed changes chosen for consideration were selected
more or less at random, partly because the writer entertained
somewhat different views concerning some of them than have
usually been taken. They were further thought to be questions of
such a character that the issue could be brought out with reason-
able sharpness in few words-a necessity if the attention of
busy individuals is to be expected and much more a necessity
if an opinion on the point is to be of value. A brief paragraph
setting forth the pros and cons of a non-legalistic character
thought to be involved was used in each case with no indication
See Moore, An Institutional Approach, to the Law of Commercial Baninvg
(1929) 38 YAin L. J. 703.
5 9 Watts 55 (Pa. 1839).
6 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 4 Mete. 49 (Blass. 1842).
1049
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the writer's opinion. To the extent only that this has been
done successfully may the replies be regarded as valid.7
The issue involved in the first case presented by the question-
naire is simple enough: should a special indorsement on bearer
paper control its future negotiation? The proposed amendment
would change the rule which has uniformly prevailed in this
country and in England for years-that paper drawn payable
to bearer may still be negotiated by delivery notwithstanding it
has been specially indorsed. The submission of the case 8 stated
carefully the probable implications of the change, not to consti-
tute a "brief" on the question, but to make sure that the
important aspects of the problem were understood. The ques-
tions asked were as follows:
(a) Should the proposed change apply to coupon bonds
so that their payment and transfer would depend on the
regularity of endorsements?
(b) If the proposed change were to be made, in your
opinion would the fact that an item appeared on its face
to be payable to bearer mislead people dealing with it into
disregarding endorsements?
(c) Are holders generally better able to guard against
losing bearer paper than purchasers or paying banks are
* to detect forged endorsements upon it?(d) May holders insure against loss or theft of bearer
paper to better advantage than purchasers or paying banks
may against forged endorsements?
(e) In your judgment, balancing all interests, is the pro-
posed change to be favored?
(f) Would you favor legislation, similar to that in Eng-
land, validating good faith payments of demand order
instruments by banks to their customers, even thdugh the
instrument bears a prior forged endorsement?
Since sending out the questionnaire it has seemed that possibly
question (a) was unfair, although the proposed amendment
would apply to bonds as well as to other instruments. It appears
altogether unnecessary to inject the forged indorsement question
into bond transfers and payments, often amounting to very
large sums. A bond that has been outstanding say for thirty
7 In view of the importance of this aspect of the matter each submission
will be set out hereafter in the footnotes.
s The following was the first case taken up by the questionnaire:
"It has been proposed that Section 40 N. I. L. (uniform enumeration)
be stricken out and that Section 9 (5) be amended so that bearer paper
which has been specially endorsed may not subsequently be negotiated, as
at present, by delivery alone. Further negotiation would be by endorsement
plus delivery. The amendment would appear to operate to the advantage
of holders who have lost bearer paper so endorsed. It would probably
operate to the disadvantage of bona fide purchasers, collecting banks and
anyone paying such items, in that it would extend the forged endorsement
risks to all such paper."
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years might become so clogged with indorsements and guaranties
as to be almost non-transferable0 If the parties want protection
of this sort they should buy registered bonds. It seems very
doubtful, although no facts are available on the point, whether
the saving to an occasional holder to accrue from the proposed
change would at all compensate for the increased cost of handling
which the amendment would necessitate. It is believed that to
a perhaps lesser extent this applies also to other bearer paper.
The banks and bond houses answering question (a) were
unanimous to the effect that the amendment should not apply to
bonds or coupons. These opinions must be given considerable
weight, inasmuch as banks are not only collecting and paying
agents, but purchasers and holders of such securities as well.
The lawyers were divided in their views, about seventy-five per
cent opposing the proposed change. In contrast with this, the
law teachers were unanimously in favor of the change, even as
applied to bonds.1o The division of opinion in regard to bearer
paper generally, raised by question (e), was substantially the
same although one of the large New York banks thought the
change defensible if limited to bearer checks. There was scarcely
any support whatever, even among the banks, for the English
rule sanctioning payments of demand instruments made over
forged indorsements. 11
The attitude of the banks with reference to the risk of transit
loss in the case of bearer bonds was expressed by one of the
principal Bridgeport banks, saying that "it is far better to use
insurance as protection against loss when mailing" than to
incumber payment and transfer as proposed. It was further
brought out with regard to the risk of safekeeping that bonds
are usually kept with a safe deposit company so that actually
this risk is very small. Moreover, it is not at all clear that
holders would ever specially indorse bonds or other bearer paper
9 When one considers also that several hundred thousand dollars of such
bonds are not infrequently presented in a single day for payment at their
maturity, something of the problem the amendment would force on the
maker or paying agent may be better appreciated.
:L0 This attitude was stated in one instance to be based on the fact that
it was assumed to represent the commercial viewpoint. Possibly this is
to be traced to the statement made by Professor Brannan in regard to
bearer paper generally that "the opinion of bankers consulted by the writer
and by his colleague, Professor Williston, was unanimous to this effect."
BI-ANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INsTRuIE Ts LAW (4th ed. 1926) :327. It is in-
teresting to compare the unanimous opinions to the opposite effect elicited
by this questionnaire.
31 It seems probable that the English rule in this connection [BILLS OF
EXCHANGE ACT § 60], which has been of considerable protection to paying
banks, was not sufficiently understood. At the same time the negative
answer by the banks is some testimony to the disinterestedness with which
the questionnaire was answered.
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to obtain the protection of the proposed amendment in the large
number of cases where the paper is being held merely as an
investment. Special indorsements are not used until a transfer
is to be made.
Questions (b), (c) and (d) applying to bearer paper generally
were designed as in the nature of special interrogatories to test
the validity of the above results. It was thought that a finding
should be had on the possible unfairness of the change to those
who might assume that bearer paper was still transferable by
delivery. Further, assuming that losses will continue to occur
through fault of neither party, an estimation was wanted of the
relative ability of the parties to the transaction to avoid the loss
in the first instance, or to shift it conveniently.12 An attorney
in Ohio expressed himself on this endeavor in the strictly ortho-
dox way: "Do not feel this question should enter into discussion
of the law. Right and wrong should govern, not insurance."
The banks and attorneys answered (b) in the affirmative and
practically all of the teachers conceded that the change might
lead into error in some cases, at least at first. Of course, if
an exception is to be made in the case of bonds, coupons and
other similar bearer paper, as seems necessary, the position of
bearer checks would always be more or less misleading. Only
two answered flatly that it would not be misleading. The ques-
tions concerning ability to avoid loss, or to insure against it to
advantage, also produced a sharp division of opinion. The banks
were unanimous to the effect that a holder is in a better position
ordinarily to guard his paper, or to insure it when sending it
through the mail, than a purchaser, collecting bank or paying
agent would be to detect forged indorsements. But whatever
weight should be given to this consideration, the affirmative
answer would seem quite obvious, when one considers that it is
impossible to verify all indorsements before handling an item.
Disregarding entirely the fact that the holder need not have
taken a bearer instrument to start with, he can take any precau-
tions for the protection of his paper he may think desirable.
In this the lawyers also agreed. But the teachers again were
largely on the opposite side.
Aside from bonds, the most important type of paper the
amendment would affect would be bearer checks. These circu-
late to a considerable extent. In fact even order checks in large
numbers are transferred by blank indorsement. It seems fair
to say, though no facts are at hand to support the statement,
that for the most part only items involving relatively small
amounts in local circulation are handled in this way. Obviously
as to these the statute would ordinarily not come into play in
12 These tests in their application both to court decisions and new legisla-
tion were discussed more fully in the writer's previous article, supra note 1.
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any case because it is not the habit to indorse specially. Thus
the only risk of much importance in the situation, which is not
in practice voluntarily assumed by the parties, would arise in
the case of collections requiring transit by mail. As to this
point, however, there already is authority that proper handling
of bearer paper by collecting banks may require that they carry
insurance.13 Blanket policies covering this risk can be carried
by banks, in view of the volume handled, at relatively low cost.14
It would seem that a much better solution of the problem than
that proposed would be to make provision in the proposed uni-
form bank collection statute for this point, leaving the rules as
to the transfer and payment of bearer paper unchanged.
The second case, 15 the proposal to amend Section 71 concerning
the time for presentment of demand instruments, was accom-
panied by the following questions:
(a) Should an effort be made to bring about earlier retire-
ment of all demand paper?
(b) Would the law be more readily understood if the
reasonable-time-after-issue test were to apply both to draw-
ers and endorsers?
(c) Have decisions of the courts as to what constitutes
a reasonable time in these cases been satisfactory in your
experience?
(d) Is it commercially practicable to await court decision
as to what amounts to a reasonable time, before you may
know what your rights are against secondary parties?
(e) Would you favor legislation fixing definitely the time
within which presentment of interest-bearing demand notes
must be made as, for example, one year after date?
(f) If a time should be stated for presentment, what
period should be fixed in the case of non-interest-bearing
demand notes?
13 See Bank of Monango v. Ellendale Nat. Bank, 52 N. D. 8, 201 N. W.
839 (1924), 40 L. R. A. 839 (1926). This case concerned a transmission of
Liberty Bonds.
14 Safe-keeping accounts, according to a large New York bank, are now
quite generally covered by blanket policies and such insurance can likewise
be obtained to cover transit losses.
15 The case was submitted as follows:
"It is proposed to amend Sectioii 71 relating to presentment for pay-
ment of demand instruments. The suggestion is to provide that, hereafter,
presentment must be made (and of course followed by notice of dishonor)
as to each endorser, within a reasonable time after his endorsement and,
as to drawers of demand bills, within a reasonable time after the issue
of the instrument. At present the reasonable-time-after-issue test applics
to endorsers of demand notes, but presentment of demand bills may be
made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof, in order
to charge endorsers and drawers. In Nebraska the statute has been modi-
fied to provide the reasonable-time-after-issue test for all drawers and
endorsers of demand instruments. The proposed amendment would prob-




It is evident that this case could not readily be presented to
raise a sharp issue. It is difficult to show that it makes much
difference whether a reasonable-time-after-indorsement test or
a reasonable-time-after-issue test is to be applied. Both are
somewhat illusory. The writer prefers the latter in the interest
of simplicity of application, inasmuch as the same rule could be
applied as to all secondary parties. Very few answers to ques-
tions (b), however, gave any support to the view that one test
would be any simpler or better understood than the other.
The first question, whether an effort should be made to bring
about the earlier payment of demand paper, was based on the
assumption that the proposed reasonable-time-after-indorsement
test, if adopted, would result in a somewhat shorter time than
that which obtains with the reasonable-time-after-issue test. The
banks replying to the question were about equally divided, a
majority considering that there ,was no need to resort to this
means of forcink the earlier retirement of such paper.10
A majority of both the lawyers and teachers held the opposite
view.
Possibly this result must be qualified by the answers to ques-
tions (d), (e) and (f). In reply to (d) it was agreed by nearly
everyone that it would be commercially desirable, if possible, to
state a more definite rule than any "reasonable time" test. There
was practically unanimous agreement, in answer to question (e),
that one year from date of issue would be a satisfactory period
within which presentment should be made to charge indorsers
on interest bearing demand notes. And while most answers
fixed the same date for non-interest bearing instruments, a few
suggested a shorter period, as thirty days or six months. It
seems probable from this that no such urgency for early present-
ment of demand paper was felt as might appear from the
answers to question (a). But while this evidence would support
a fixed rule of one year, at least as applied to interest-bearing
demand notes, the subject is one which should be given thorough
consideration. Particularly is this true in the case of items
arising in foreign commerce. But at least, it may be said that
a change to increased definiteness would meet with much greater
favor than the proposed amendment.
The third case 17 lent itself more readily to brief presentation.
What rights should a purchaser after maturity be given against
an accommodation signer? The following questions were asked:
16 A writer for one of the largest commercial paper houses in the country,
who professed over thirty years experience in the field, answered question
(a), "Why? I see no reason."
17 This question was presented as follows:
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(a) Do accommodation parties generally expect to limit
their responsibility to cases where the accommodated party
has negotiated the instrument before maturity?
(b) Do purchasers from the payee (accommodated party)
after mwturity assume that the accommodation party can
be held responsible?(c) Should the question be left for court decision as cases
arise?
(d) As to demand notes, should a definite time, for ex-
ample, one year after date, be stated within which nego-
tiation must take place if the accommodation party is to be
held?
(e) Should the same time apply in the case of demand
bills of exchange drawn or accepted for accommodation?
A substantial majority both of banks and lawyers were of the
opinion that accommodation signers do not expect to limit their
responsibility to cases where negotiation is had before matur-
ity.18 The teaching profession was almost unanimous to the
opposite effect. It is possible that both sets of answers were
motivated to some extent by what was regarded as being the
better rule. One or two of the teachers amplified their replies
to say that they did not like the case of Marlizg v. Joncs.lo An
attorney from Oklahoma, on the other hand, expressed the
majority view to the contrary, answering question (a) "Abso-
lutely No." It was agreed by a large majority of banks, lawyers
and teachers in reply to question (c) that the rule adopted should
be settled definitely one way or the other, and not left to the
courts for a decision based on the supposed intentions of the
parties in each case. So question (d), whether a one year time
limit should be fixed for negotiation of demand notes, was
approved by a large majority in each class. A few favored a
shorter period for demand bills. No one wanted a longer period
except a minority who felt that no limit should be imposed. '2
In view of these replies it would seem very difficult to say that
"In several states the courts recently have ruled that a good faith
purchaser of an instrument first negotiated sometime after maturity might
recover against the accommodation maker or endorser. The courts regarded
this result as required by Section 29. It is proposed to amend the section
so that recovery in these cases will depend on whether, in the opinion of a
court or jury, the accommodation party may be said to have intended
negotiation after maturity."
is The Boston banks thought accommodation parties intended such a
limitation, which, to that extent at least, verifies Professor Brannan's
finding that "this is the merchant's view of the case" which he ascertained
after "consultations with a number of bankers, who were unanimous in
their opinions." BRANNAN,, op. Cift. snpra note 10, at 288.
VI 138 Wis. 82, 119 N. W. 931 (1909). This ease has been follow ed
recently, making the point one of practical importance if uniformity is
to be attained. See (1926) 24 Mic. L. Rm,. 847.20 An attorney in South Dakota took this view, saying that a limitation
"Would add a technical defense that (the) parties did not have in mind."
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there is any uniform "mercantile understanding" concerning
the time within which negotiation of time paper should take
place for this purpose. There is considerable opinion in favor
of fixing the rule definitely. As to demand paper this can be
attained by the one year provision which has been proposed.
Possibly the best solution of the problem as to time paper, how-
ever, would be to state a presumption that the parties intended
to be bound only in case negotiation occurred before maturity,
leaving it open in those cases where the parties agreed otherwise
for the converse to be proved without infringing upon the parol
evidence rule.
Only one situation out of the many proposed amendments to
Sections 119 and 120 was presented-that relating to the question
whether suretyship defenses should be available to the accom-
modation maker.21 It is of course well settled that the accommo-
dation party as indorser is accorded a type of suretyship position;
at the same time a large majority of states have held that an
accommodation party as maker or co-maker has contracted as a
primary party and is not therefore entitled to such defenses.2r
To the writer, the majority rule is much to be preferred inas-
much as it is more adaptable than the minority rule. An accom-
modation party can, by signing as a primary party, waive his
suretyship defenses, while as an indorser he can preserve them.
In whichever capacity he signs, his position is definite. This
avoids all of the difficulties attendant upon proving whether in
a particular case the holder had notice of the accommodation
character of the signing or not. Notice of the accommodation
character would be immaterial in either case, thus avoiding a
fruitful source of litigation.
The following interrogatories were presented: 21
(a) In your experience, do accommodation parties now
assume that in signing as maker or co-maker their obliga-
tion is greater than if they signed on the back of the paper
as endorser?
(b) If so, is this accounted for by the fact that, as
21 This subject was presented as follows:
"It is proposed to make a number of changes in Sections 119 and 120
relating to discharge of instrument and of parties with the general object
of giving accommodation parties the benefits of common-law suretyship
defenses. To consider one situation affected, suppose a stockholder signs
a note with his company and for its accommodation. He may sign as (1)
endorser, (2) co-maker, or (3) if the instrument is drawn to the order of
the company, as sole maker. If the payee were subsequently to extend the
time of payment, for example, without obtaining the accommodation
signer's consent, it is held in a majority of states that the accommodation
party would be discharged in (1) but not in (2) and (3). The suggested
change would probably allow the signer to be discharged in all three cases."22 BR.NNAN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 721.
23 See supra note 21 for a statement of the problem as presented.
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,endorser, an accommodation signer is entitled to notice of
dishonor, while, as maker or co-maker he is not?
(c) Is it convenient commercially to provide either of two
possible contracts for the accommodation signer, depending
on his bargain, as is done in most states; that is, if he signs
as endorser, to accord him the protection of any signer in
that capacity, but, if he signs as maker or co-maker, to
provide that he assumes the obligation of a primary party
and is not discharged, for example, because of an extension
of time?
(d) Is there any injustice in denying suretyship defenses
to the accommodation maker?
The first point to be verified was the importance commonly
attached in the business world to the two signings-as indorser
and as maker. It was thought that there was a general belief
that an accommodation party assumes a more onerous obligation
as maker than as indorser. Questions (a) and (b) were
designed to ascertain whether this assumption had any basis in
fact. Over three to one of the total replies indicated the existence
of such a general understanding. A few doubted that accom-
modation parties generally had any understanding of their obli-
gation, regardless of the position in which they signed. Ques-
tion (b) probably called for too close a distinction to be
answered with any degree of assurance. Of those answering
(a) affirmatively, however, the large majority answered (b) "in
part" or "partially" or "perhaps to some extent," indicating that
the matter of notice was not understood to be the whole distinc-
tion. Of course this general finding has considerable support
also in the opinions of the majority courts in which it is said
that the accommodation maker in so signing assumes a "primary
obligation." 2- Evidently this is more than a technical view.
The next question, (c), raised the principal issue squarely,
although at least one bank answered in the negative because of
the supposed indefiniteness of the situation under the majority
rule. Needless to say it is more definite than the proposed
amendment would be, if that involves going back to the surety-
ship rules at common-law, as apparently is proposed. The banks
by a substantial majority answered question (c) in the affirma-
tive. Among the teachers the affirmative vote was greater, but
the attorneys by a majority of three favored the contrary view
that a "surety" is entitled to the usual suretyship defenses re-
gardless of the capacity in which he signs. The answers to
(d) concerning the possible injustice of the majority rule were
colored largely by the view taken of the parties' understand-
ing of the situation. The bankers who thought that accom-
modation parties now understand their obligations to be greater




as maker than as indorser answered that there was no
injustice in denying such signers suretyship defenses. This
amounted to saying that a signing as maker constituted a waiver
of these defenses. Although this evidence, taken as a whole,
cannot of course be regarded as at all conclusive, it certainly
affords little support for the proposed amendment on the point.
It would be better to change the rule in the minority states to
accord with that generally obtaining.
Two situations were taken up which have not yet been made
the subject of a proposed amendment. The first of these 22
related to the highly uncertain question of what acceleration
provisions may be employed in an instrument without destroying
its negotiability.26 Is there a place for such clauses in negotiable
paper and, if so, what, if any, limitations should be prescribed?
The following questions were asked:
(a) Would you favor attempting to define certain contin-
gencies having to do with the loan or its security which
alone might be made events of default without destroying
negotiability?
(b) Would you favor legislation similar to that in Wis-
consin?
(c) In your opinion, would any extension of the use of
acceleration provisions in negotiable instruments operate
unfairly to borrowers?
(d) Would the increased security to lenders from such
provisions be reflected in lower interest rates?
(e) Would such provisions affect adversely the transfer-
ability of paper containing them?
Questions (a) and (b) were framed to raise the problem
whether a broad authorization should be given, as in Wisconsin,
or whether only certain types of provisions should be sanctioned.
The banks for the most part answered both in the affirmative,
showing a lack of discrimination, but giving proof of the com-
mercial importance of the subject. Several banks, one of them
25 In the questionnaire the matter was presented as follows:
"In many states a provision accelerating the maturity of a time instru-
ment, for example, upon the borrower's failure to deposit additional col-
lateral in event of depreciation in the market value of collateral already
pledged, would render the instrument non-negotiable. In Wisconsin the
statute has been. modified so that without affecting its negotiability, an
instrument may be drawn to provide for the acceleration of maturity upon
the happening of any contingency. No amendment has been proposed as
yet in this case."
26 The effect of the current type of acceleration provisions has only
recently come before the Court of Appeals in New York and then only in an
indirect way. It seems probable, however, that the New York court when
called upon to do so will go to considerable lengths to sanction the pro-
visions of this character in ordinary use. Most of the authorities are cited
in First Nat. Bank v. Blackman, 249 N. Y. 322, 164 N. E. 113 (1928).
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a leading Boston bank, however, approved question (a) but
refused to sanction (b) for the reason that it was "too broad."
Almost all the teachers were also of this opinion. A considerable
number of lawyers were interested in the administrative diffi-
culties that might be encountered in applying any limiting
description. Their attitude seemed to be that, granted the desir-
ability of such clauses, the type and extent of their use should
be left largely to the good judgment of the people concerned.
This would have the merit of permitting change to meet varying
conditions without requiring further amendment to the statute.
It does not appear that the Wisconsin amendment has resulted
in misuse.
Questions (c), (d) and (e), designed to test the general desir-
ability of acceleration provisions, were answered in the same way
by a large majority of each class. It was pointed out in answer to
(e) that an acceleration note may be considerably less uncertain
and less harsh on the borrower than a demand note, which, it
appears, is coming to be used more often in many sections as
an alternative form. 7 It was interesting to note the reaction
to the question whether interest rates might be lowered to reflect
the greater security given the holder of a note containing accel-
eration provisions. Of the few who did not answer with a flat
negative, the answers ranged from that of an Illinois bank,
"Some cases, yes" through "doubtful," "perhaps," "very doubt-
ful" to "possibly." Practically everyone was agreed that, if
the law were definite, not requiring recourse to the courts for
continual interpretation, the introduction of such clauses would
tend to facilitate transfer rather than the reverse. This, no
doubt, was based on the assumption, although the point was not
adverted to, that a purchaser, without notice of an earlier accel-
eration, might be a holder in due course, contrary to the decisions
in some states. -8 Whether it is desirable to go to the extent of
the Wisconsin act or not, there seems to be little doubt from the
evidence received in this connection that the time has come to
sanction further acceleration provisions. In the opinion of the
writer it will be difficult to devise any formula meeting the
requirements of the case which would be as satisfactory as the
Wisconsin amendment.
The second question presented 29 which has not as yet been
27A St. Louis bank submitted a form it employs which reads: "On
demand, and if no demand is made, then on.. :' From the maher's
standpoint this differs little from the ordinary demand note, as far as
certainty of time is concerned.
28 See Hodge v. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84, 108 N. W. 212 (1906). The point
should be provided for by amendment.
29 The questionnaire presentation follows:
"It was held recently in New York that the refusal of a bank to certify
a check upon proper presentment did not constitute a dishonor allowing the
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made the subject of an amendment related to the effect to be
given to a refusal by a bank to certify a properly presented check.
The following interrogatories were used:
(a) Do holders understand that a refusal to certify is not
a dishonor?
(b) In approximately what percentage of cases, if any,
do banks refuse certification of checks which they would be
willing to pay?
(c) What reasons, if any, exist for refusing certification
of such items?
(d) In what cases, if any, do banks certify checks which
they would not pay?
(e) Should a bank be held responsible to its depositor for
injury to his credit if it refuses to certify a check which it
would pay?
The answers to question (a) established rather clearly
that most people now assume that a refusal to certify constitutes
a dishonor, as would a refusal to pay. In view of this, a rule
requiring a re-presentment for payment, in case of a refusal to
certify, before recourse may be had against secondary parties
seems to be an insistence on formality having little justification.5 °
The answers to question (b), however, indicate that the prob-
lem is not so easily settled. In most states it appears banks
certify almost any check which they would pay-the only excep-
tion being the very small check where the service would not
warrant the additionial bookkeeping required. But in several
states a practice is developing of refusing to certify checks
altogether, or only at the instance of the drawer.3 1 The most
widely stated reason for this development is the Illinois de-
cision 3 2 which held a bank obligated to pay a check according
holder immediate recourse against the drawer. The same rule apparently
applies to endorsers. It is thus made necessary for a holder to re-present
such an item for payment in order to charge secondary parties."
30 A holder was recently denied a cause of action on this statement of
facts in New York. Wachtel v. Rosen, 223 App. Div. 416, 228 N. Y. Supp.
476 (1st Dep't 1928), aff'd, 249 N. Y. 386, 164 N. E. 326 (1928).
31 A bank in Decatur, Illinois stated that its practice is to certify only
at the request of the drawer in order to avoid possible double liability in
case a raised check is certified. See National City Bank v. Nat. Bank of
the Republic, 300 Ill. 103, 132 N. E. 832 (1921). A New Jersey attorney
wrote that the same practice prevails among some banks in New Jersey,
An attorney in Reno, Nevada wrote to the same effect. A Kansas City
bank stated that, inasmuch as the Missouri courts have held that a drawer
who has procured certification may stop payment, it refuses all certifica-
tions. See Bathgate v. Exchange Bank, 199 Mo. App. 583, 205 S. W. 875
(1918). A bank in Helena, Montana wrote, "We always pay rather than
certify," giving as a reason, "too much trouble." A reply from Florida
indicates that another reason may be that when a cashier's check is issued
in lieu of certification a charge may be made for the service.
32National City Bank v. Nat. Bank of the Republic, supra note 31.
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to its tenor at the time of certification where the payee's name
had been altered, although recognizing that the bank was not
privileged to charge the payment to its customer's account. At
the time this case was decided, it was both criticized and ap-
proved for theoretical reasons,33 but whatever the merits of that
controversy, it would seem highly essential that now the question
be resolved contrary to the Illinois decision, for certainly no one
would wish to jeopardize the entire certification practice in order
to protect the bona fide holder in the rare instances where the
item was certified after having been raised. Although business
would, of course, continue even though the certification practice
were to be abandoned entirely, it would seem desirable to encour-
age rather than discourage the use of bank certifications.-" The
liquidation of business payments in a higher type of paper makes
for greater confidence and stability in commercial dealings. An
amendment to Section 62 should be proposed making it clear that
both certifications and acceptances apply only to the original
tenor of the instrument.
With this out of the way there would seem to be little reason
left for the position of the New York coult in holding that a
refusal to certify should not constitute a dishonor. At the same
time the question whether a bank should be liable to its customer
for such refusal raises entirely different considerations. Alarge
majority of all answers to question (e), perhaps naturally
enough in the case of the banks, opposed such a result. A few
banks, however, even in this case stated that the bank should
be held responsible. With the possible exception of relatively
small checks, there is much point in favor of adding this sanc-
tion in furtherance of the use of certifications. The point, how-
ever, is not one gelmane to the Negotiable Instruments Law.
In conclusion, it is recognized that the several factors consid-
ered important by the writer in connection with these questions
may be valued differently by others. Whatever their weight
and the validity of the findings upon them, they are at least
relevant to the present inquiry. In time a process of evaluating
such material more accurately may be worked out. Courts have
33 See BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 571 for citations of the dis-
cussions on both sides of this question.
4  Concerning the certification practice in New York one of the large
banks there wrote as follows: "In order to understand the practical con-
siderations involved in your sixth question, it is necessary to know somc-
thing of the volume of certifications which banks in large cities are now
called upon to handle. In one of our offices alone during the period of
active stock market operations, we have been called upon to certify in
connection with brokerage transactions an average of at least twelve
hundred checks a day, most of these during the hour between two and three




never had such information available 5 It is probable that, in
time, the consideration given to such material will be as serious
as that given to the purely technical aspects of legal problems,.3
which seem to have monopolized attention heretofore. There
should be franker recognition of the fact that matters of legal
theology, while extremely important, are by no means the sole
questions involved in deciding a close case or in amending a
statute where the decisions are in conflict.
The results of this investigation, while in no sense offered as
conclusive proof, furnish a basis, at least, for questioning very
seriously the desirability of certain of the proposed amendments.
In particular, it seems quite doubtful whether any amendment
should be sponsored as to bearer paper. In the case of the
accommodation maker, the rule denying suretyship defenses, de-
veloped by a majority of the courts, would appear to have con-
siderably greater support than the proposed return to the
common-law doctrine. There is a pronounced tendency to favor
a definite time within which negotiation must take place, both
for purposes of charging secondary parties and for obligating
the accommodation maker. Further provision should be made for
acceleration clauses. And a fairly strong case seems to have
been made for amending the statute to avoid the certification
difficulties raised by the Illinois court.
35 The procedure investigation being conducted this year by Professor
Clark of the Yale Law School has already been of considerable assistance
to the Connecticut Judicial Council.
36 The sterility of the idea of fixed legal principles as a basis for decision
in new cases is very nicely illustrated in the joint bank deposit situation,
where parties and bank want to provide for survivorship. Courts when
confronted with the problem have employed all of their common-law cate-
gories, trust, gift, joint tenancy, tenancy by the entireties, contract for
the benefit of third parties, testamentary disposition, agency and what not,
in an effort to decide the question "according to law." Some have reached
the conclusion that there should be survivorship, and many the reverse.
While doctrine is of course important, it seems fairly clear that it should
not be allowed to get in the way of an admittedly just result. The cases
are discussed in Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N. E.
373 (1926) ; noted in (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 138.
1062
